\u3ci\u3eBussing v. COR Clearing, LLC\u3c/i\u3e, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014): Preserving the Right to Tell Your Employers What They Do Not Want to Hear by Knoer, Kelsey E. B.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 95 | Issue 1 Article 7
2016
Bussing v. COR Clearing , LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719
(D. Neb. 2014): Preserving the Right to Tell Your
Employers What They Do Not Want to Hear
Kelsey E. B. Knoer
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Kelsey E. B. Knoer, Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014): Preserving the Right to Tell Your Employers What
They Do Not Want to Hear, 95 Neb. L. Rev. 248 (2016)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol95/iss1/7
Note*
Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC,
20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014):
Preserving the Right to Tell Your
Employers What They Do
Not Want to Hear
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
II. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
A. The Great Recession. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
B. The Failure of Sarbanes–Oxley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
1. The Best of Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
2. How Sarbanes–Oxley Failed Whistle-Blowers . . . 255
C. Dodd–Frank and Financial Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
1. Improving Sarbanes–Oxley. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
2. The Two Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
a. The Bounty Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
b. Protecting Whistle-Blowers from
Retaliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
D. The Interpretation of Dodd–Frank’s Whistle-Blower
Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
1. The Asadi Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
2. The Chevron Deference Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
3. How Whistle-Blowers Have Faired . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
a. The Statistics of Whistle-Blowing. . . . . . . . . . . 265
b. Missing the Mark: Whistle-Blowers Left
Without Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
E. Bussing v. COR Clearing LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
1. The Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
* Kelsey E.B. Knoer, J.D. candidate, 2017, University of Nebraska College of Law.
The author wishes to thank Jaydon McDonald and Interim Dean Richard E. Mo-
berly for all of their help and guidance and Executive Editor Jen Ralph for her
endless efforts in cleaning up this piece for publication.  A special thank you to
my family, friends, and especially my husband for their love and support
throughout law school.
248
2016] WHISTLE-BLOWER PROTECTION 249
2. The District of Nebraska Steps In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
III. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
A. The District of Nebraska Correctly Interpreted the
Dodd–Frank Whistle-Blower Protections . . . . . . . . . . . 269
1. Separating the Anti-Retaliation Provision from
the Bounty Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
2. Doing Away with Chevron Deference . . . . . . . . . . . 270
3. Going Even Further: Recognizing the History of
Whistle-Blower Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
B. State Whistle-Blower Law Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
IV. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people
what they do not want to hear.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Isabelle, Isaac, and Emma all work as accountants for large finan-
cial institutions engaging in private investment management.  The
end of the fiscal year is quickly approaching.  The accountants look
over the books of their respective institutions and realize that some-
thing does not add up.  They run the numbers through again, thinking
their math is off, but the results come out the same.  Through further
investigation, they discover that their companies may have been en-
gaging in practices that could violate securities laws.  Emma, Isaac,
and Isabelle approach their respective supervisors with the numbers
and express their concerns.  Emma also reports her concerns to the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  Two days later, all
three receive word that their services are no longer necessary and are
given a box into which they can pack up their belongings.
The accountants are upset, thinking they had done the right thing
by approaching their boss in the hopes of clearing up a misunder-
standing.  They decide its time to speak to a lawyer and eventually
sue their former employers for wrongfully terminating them in retali-
ation for speaking up.  Emma and Isaac are treated as whistle-blow-
ers—employees who report misconduct—and win their cases.  They
are subsequently reinstated to their prior positions and awarded two
times back pay in damages as well as legal costs.  Isabelle’s lawsuit,
on the other hand, is dismissed outright.  She spent thousands in legal
fees and is still without a job.
1. Joe Muscolino, 10 George Orwell Quotes for Whistleblowers and Doublethinkers
Alike, SIGNATURE (June 23, 2014), http://www.signature-reads.com/2014/06/10-
george-orwell-quotes-for-whistleblowers-and-doublethinkers-alike/ [https://per
ma.unl.edu/XU8Y-PBUF].
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So what is the difference between Isaac and Isabelle?  Why is Isaac
treated similarly to Emma, while Isabelle is not, though all three of
them have the same claim—retaliation under the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank)?2  Isaac
brought his claim in the Federal District Court for the District of Ne-
braska, while Isabelle brought her claim in the Northern District of
Texas, where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdic-
tion.  Emma could have brought her claim in either judicial district
and would have been protected, as she reported the misconduct exter-
nally to the SEC, qualifying her as a whistle-blower under
Dodd–Frank.  Isaac and Isabelle, on the other hand, reported inter-
nally—within the company to a manager or other supervising author-
ity—and the question of whether they are protected from retaliation
after reporting is the subject of an ongoing debate.
This Note focuses on the Federal District Court for the District of
Nebraska’s interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision of
Dodd–Frank and how it differs from other federal court interpreta-
tions.  Part II provides a social and legal background of Dodd–Frank
and the anti-retaliation protection of whistle-blowers under past stat-
utes.  Part II also analyzes how internal whistle-blowers have faired
under Dodd–Frank and the various approaches the courts have taken
in interpreting its anti-retaliation provision, including the approach
taken by the District of Nebraska in Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC.3
Part III argues that the Bussing court: (a) correctly interpreted the
anti-retaliation provision by taking into account the intent and public
policy behind Dodd–Frank, correctly making use of Chevron deference
unnecessary and (b) opened the door for a more consistent approach to
the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine applied
by nearly all states.  Finally, in Part IV this Note concludes that the
District of Nebraska’s approach to anti-retaliation protection of whis-
tle-blowers is the surest way to preserve the integrity of internal whis-
tle-blowing programs within companies, while protecting those
employees most in need of protection from retaliation—those who told
their employer what their employers do not want to hear.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Great Recession
In the face of immense pressure by investors to maintain high re-
turns, financial institutions increasingly relaxed some of their lending
criteria in order to persuade even more people to become homeown-
ers.4  As these new homeowners found themselves unable to keep up
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
3. 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014).
4. GOODWIN ET AL., MACROECONOMICS IN CONTEXT 346 (2d ed. 2014).
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with their mortgage payments, they faced foreclosure.  After increased
foreclosures, the financial institutions who had provided those mort-
gages found themselves with greater liabilities than they had assets.5
Large banks began to go bankrupt, and when Lehman Brothers even-
tually collapsed, worried consumers withdrew their stocks from the
market.6  Thus, the financial crisis began when the collapse erased
more than half the total market value of the outstanding shares of
companies in the market.7
The initial governmental response took the form of equity or asset
purchases of failed financial institutions, such as the Bear Stearns in-
vestment house, mortgage brokers Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Leh-
man Brothers, and international insurance firm AIG.8  These
financial institutions had long been recognized as “too big to fail” be-
cause the companies had grown so large that their failure would result
in even greater and more widespread economic harm in the form of
lost jobs and reduced asset values.9  Should the companies ever run
into trouble financially, it was believed that the government would
have to step in because the economy could not afford their failure.  The
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) authorized the U.S. Treasury
to spend as much as $700 billion in loans, stock purchases, and asset
buyouts for insolvent banks, in addition to the earlier loans provided
by the Federal Government.10
In 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, “a direct and comprehen-
sive response to the financial crisis that nearly crippled the U.S. econ-
5. See generally Neil Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, The Roots of the Great Recession,
in THE GREAT RECESSION 21 (David B. Grusky et al. eds., 2011) (explaining the
proximate cause of the “Great Recession”).
6. Id.
7. David B. Grusky et al., The Consequences of the Great Recession, in THE GREAT
RECESSION, supra note 5, at 4.
8. Id. at 4–5.  On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers, with $639 billion in assets
and $619 billion in debt, filed for the largest bankruptcy in history. ROSALIND Z.
WIGGINS ET AL., THE LEHMAN BROTHERS BANKRUPTCY A: OVERVIEW 2 (2014).  Leh-
man was the fourth-largest U.S. investment bank at the time of its collapse, em-
ploying 25,000 people worldwide. Id.  Its bankruptcy wiped out $46 billion of its
market value, and its stock plummeted 93% in just three days.  Richard Lartey,
What Caused the Collapse of Lehman Brothers? 16 (July 6, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.jteall.com/Lehman%20Brothers%2001.pdf [https://per
ma.unl.edu/PVG3-7782].  Lehman was the largest company to fail during the
U.S. subprime mortgage induced financial crisis. Id. at 3.  The Bear Stearns in-
vestment house was rescued via a government-engineered purchase by J.P. Mor-
gan Chase, and mortgage brokers Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken over
by the government before the Lehman Brothers fell into bankruptcy.  Grusky et
al., supra note 7, at 5.  The international insurance firm AIG was nationalized
the day after the Lehman Brothers collapse. Id.
9. GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 353.
10. Grusky et al., supra note 7, at 5; GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 353.
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omy,”11 stating, “the American people will never again be asked to foot
the bill for Wall Street’s mistakes.”12  The President’s statements re-
flected the discontent of many with the enactment of TARP, as it was
agreed upon that the failure was a result of the banks’ recklessness,
not poor fortune.13  Despite agreeing with the decision to provide the
large financial industries with a bailout rather than face a potential
and complete economic collapse, many banking industry critics
pointed out that had the banks not been permitted to grow “too big” in
the first place, the problem would not have surfaced at all.14  They
argued that “after banks (or companies in any sector of our economy)
[became] aware that they [were] ‘too big,’ they [had] an incentive to
take on greater risks, anticipating that they [would] lose very little
regardless of the outcome of their ventures” because the government
would assist them in the event of failure.15  TARP had essentially
used taxpayer money to shoulder $700 billion worth of risk in bailing
out these institutions while many millions of households suffered
large losses of their own.16  In signing “the toughest consumer finan-
cial protections in our history,” President Obama acknowledged that
“[f]or years, our financial sector was governed by antiquated and
poorly enforced rules that allowed some to game the system and take
risks that endangered the entire economy.”17
Richard Bowen, who had been fired from Citigroup after sending a
memo to his superiors enumerating his concerns regarding the com-
pany’s mortgage underwriting process, testified before the SEC in
July 2008, alerting the government to the treatment whistle-blowers
faced when they reported misconduct to their employers.18  This retal-
iation took place despite potential liability under the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act of 2002.19  Had whistle-blowers been less afraid of retaliation by
their employers for speaking up, the reckless practices of these compa-
11. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 731 (D. Neb. 2014) (citing S.
REP. 111-176, at 2 (2010)).
12. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), https://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-
street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act [https://perma.unl.edu/5A7H-399J].
13. See GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 353.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Obama, supra note 12.
18. Cheryl Hall, Citigroup Whistleblower Still on the Trail of the Too-Big-To-Fail,
DALL. NEWS (Feb. 14, 2015, 8:41 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/col
umnists/cheryl-hall/20150214-citigroup-whistleblower-still-on-the-trail-of-the-too
-big-to-fail.ece.  The SEC is withholding the 926 pages of documents and tran-
scripts of Bowen’s hearing because they contained information “that could be
competitively harmful to Citigroup—i.e., trade secrets.” Id.
19. Id.  Bowen ultimately accepted a severance package from Citigroup in January
2009 that was less than a million dollars and settled his federal complaint. Id.
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nies may have been discovered before it was too late.  This could have
prevented the financial crisis in the first place.
B. The Failure of Sarbanes–Oxley
After Enron and WorldCom went bankrupt, costing shareholders
billions of dollars, Congress recognized the importance of the whistle-
blowers who brought the underlying scandals to light.20  Sherron Wat-
kins, a vice president of Enron, brought her concerns of accounting
fraud, the manipulation of state markets, and bribery of foreign state
officials to the attention of the CEO and Chairman of the Board, be-
lieving she “would be handing Ken Lay his leadership moment.”21  In-
stead, when Watkins stepped out of his office, Lay called the
company’s lawyer and asked if he could fire Watkins without breaking
state whistle-blower law.22  Similarly, Cynthia Cooper, an accounting
supervisor at WorldCom, discovered the use of improper accounting
techniques to cover up massive losses, and despite recognizing the
possibility that she could lose her job, she took her concerns to the
auditing committee.23  The fraudulent practices and regulatory fail-
ures of the companies were publicized, and the public cried out for
better protections.24  As a result, Congress included “strong and un-
precedented anti-retaliation protection for corporate employees” in the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–Oxley).25  Despite the praise
of scholars as “one of the most protective anti-retaliation provisions in
the world,”26 it soon became apparent that the Act had some “major
defects”27 that contributed to the “ineffectiveness of the Department
in protecting whistle-blowers.”28
1. The Best of Intentions
Sarbanes–Oxley protects from retaliation any employee who rea-
sonably believes the employer was engaging in conduct that violated
federal securities laws and who either “provide[s] information,
cause[s] information to be provided, or otherwise assist[s] in an inves-
tigation” regarding such conduct.29  For a demonstration of the ad-
20. Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 67
(2007).
21. ROBERT G. VAUGHN, THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 151
(2012).
22. Id. at 151.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Moberly, supra note 20, at 67.
26. Id. at 65.
27. STEPHEN MARTIN KOHN, THE WHISTLEBLOWER’S HANDBOOK 37 (2011).
28. VAUGHN, supra note 21, at 201.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2012).
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ministrative process of Sarbanes–Oxley and the remedies provided
under the statute, imagine you are working as a manager for a branch
of a large national bank.  You realize management at the corporate
office is engaging in securities fraud and feeding you false information
regarding the worth of the stocks you are supposed to be selling.
Under Sarbanes–Oxley, if you report this information or otherwise en-
gage in other statutorily-protected behavior—such as assisting in an
investigation—and you are subsequently demoted, discriminated
against, fired, or otherwise retaliated against for doing so, you have
ninety days to file a complaint with the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA).30  OSHA will dismiss complaints that
fail to make a prima facie showing of retaliation.  Therefore, your com-
plaint must show that you engaged in protected activity, the employer
knew about that activity, you suffered an “unfavorable personnel ac-
tion,” and the complaint made a “prima facie showing that [the] pro-
tected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action . . . .”31
Should OSHA find that such an inference can be made, the defendant
employer has the opportunity to show, by “clear and convincing evi-
dence, that it would have taken the same adverse action in the ab-
sence of the complainant’s protected activity.”32
If your employer meets this clear and convincing burden of proof
that the protected activity was not the cause of the adverse employ-
ment action, the complaint is dismissed and no investigation is con-
ducted.  However, if you present a prima facie case and the employer
fails to meet its burden of proof, then OSHA will conduct an investiga-
tion.33  If OSHA finds reasonable cause to believe you were retaliated
against for taking a protected action, then OSHA will issue a prelimi-
nary order of relief.34  This order shall include, where necessary: rein-
statement of your prior position with the same seniority standing,
back pay with interest, and compensation for any special damages
such as litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney
fees.35  If reasonable cause is not found, then OSHA will notify the
parties of that finding.  Finally, if the Department of Labor does not
completely resolve a complaint within 180 days, you as the em-
ployee—but not your employer—may file a claim in federal court.36
30. Id. § 1514A(a), (b)(2)(D).  By incorporating into Sarbanes–Oxley the procedural
rules of an earlier statute providing whistle-blower protection for employees who
report airline safety problems, Congress charged OSHA with the authority to in-
vestigate Sarbanes–Oxley whistle-blower complaints.  Moberly, supra note 20, at
78.
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(e)(1)–(3) (2015).
32. Id. § 1980.104(e)(4).
33. Id. § 1980.104(d), (e)(5).
34. Id. § 1980.105(a)(1).
35. Id.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (2012).
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2. How Sarbanes–Oxley Failed Whistle-Blowers
During its first three years, only 3.6% of Sarbanes–Oxley whistle-
blowers won relief through the initial administrative process.37  On
appeal from these decisions, administrative law judges in the Depart-
ment of Labor found in favor of a mere 6.5% of whistle-blowers.38
Many claims were dismissed because whistle-blowers failed to meet
the administrative procedural requirements imposed by the Depart-
ment of Labor or the statutory requirements as a matter of law.39  In-
stead of protecting a broad number of disclosures and other activities
allowed under the language of Sarbanes–Oxley, the administrative
panels adopted more restrictive interpretations.  The courts also failed
to exercise the discretion provided them to excuse an employee’s late
filing.  Further, when the courts did not dismiss the cases as a matter
of law, they misapplied the burden of proof regarding causation.40
Even though the burdens of proof provided under Sarbanes–Oxley
were thought to be employee-friendly, they were interpreted in much
stricter terms.41
A principle aim of Sarbanes–Oxley was to promote the establish-
ment of robust internal corporate governance mechanisms and
processes that could promptly identify and remedy violations of secur-
ity law.42  But in pursuing this goal, Sarbanes–Oxley had largely
fallen short.  So with the failures of the Sarbanes–Oxley whistle-
blower provisions in mind and in light of the Great Recession, Con-
gress enacted Dodd–Frank in 2010, using Sarbanes–Oxley as a model.
C. Dodd–Frank and Financial Reform
Congress had hoped that Dodd–Frank would transform the treat-
ment of whistle-blowers like Richard Bowen, not just under the law,
but within company policies as well.  Dodd–Frank was a “comprehen-
37. Moberly, supra note 20, at 67.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 67–68.  “Despite a burden of proof for causation that clearly favors employ-
ees, OSHA decided in favor of the employee in only 10.7% of the cases in which it
evaluated the causation element of an employee’s allegations . . . .” Id. at 72.
41. Scholars question the appropriateness of OSHA’s involvement in the enforcement
of Sarbanes–Oxley at all.  “[F]rom the Act’s inception, OSHA seemed like an un-
likely choice . . . .  Although the agency administers thirteen other whistleblower
provisions, the type of corporate fraud at issue in Sarbanes–Oxley cases seems
far removed from the worker safety and health issues addressed by many of the
other statutes under OSHA’s purview.” Id. at 146; see also Larry E. Ribstein,
Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, 2005 N.Z. L. REV. 365, 371 (noting that “Con-
gress delegated enforcement [of Sarbanes-Oxley] to safety and health regulators
unsophisticated in financial fraud rather than to securities regulators.”).
42. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant at 6 n.7, Safarian v. Am. DG Energy Inc., 622 F. App’x 149 (3d Cir.
2015) (unpublished) [hereinafter Brief for the SEC].
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sive reform of the U.S. financial regulatory system”43 and was “de-
signed to improve accountability, resiliency, and transparency in the
financial system.”44  One component of that reform was the amend-
ment of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 “to provide incentives
for whistleblowers to report to the SEC in the form of a ‘bounty’ pro-
gram, through which whistleblowers may receive financial awards
from the SEC for providing the SEC with original information relating
to violation of the securities laws.”45  A whistle-blower is defined by
the act as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals act-
ing jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the se-
curities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or
regulation, by the Commission.”46
1. Improving Sarbanes–Oxley
The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference
explained that “[Dodd–Frank] further enhances incentives and protec-
tions for whistleblowers providing information leading to successful
SEC enforcement actions.”47  Dodd–Frank both expanded current
whistle-blower protections under Sarbanes–Oxley and created a pri-
vate cause of action for employees when their employers retaliate
against them for taking certain protected actions.48  This means that,
instead of pursuing the action by first filing a complaint with OSHA,
who then investigates and gathers evidence on the employee’s behalf,
the employee could assert a private statutory right under Dodd–Frank
to pursue the claim on their own in a federal district court.49
Dodd–Frank also provided a longer statute of limitations.  Where
Sarbanes–Oxley requires a report to be filed within 180 days of the
violation or knowledge of the violation, Dodd–Frank only requires that
an action be brought no more than six to ten years after the violation
occurred or the material facts of the violation first became known.50
Finally, while a successful plaintiff under Sarbanes–Oxley may pro-
vide for reinstatement of the employee’s position, back pay, and other
43. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013).
44. S. REP. NO. 111–176, at 2 (2010).
45. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 728 (D. Neb. 2014).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
47. H. R. NO. 111–517, at 870 (2010) (Conf. Rep.).
48. MICHAEL DELIKAT & RENÉE PHILLIPS, CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE
SARBANES-OXLEY/DODD-FRANK ERA § 16:1 (2d ed. 2015).
49. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) (2012) (requiring filing with OSHA), with id.
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (allowing private statutory right).
50. Compare id. § 1514A(b)(1) (requiring that a report be filed within 180 days), with
id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (having a statute of limitations of at least six years).
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reasonable fees, Dodd–Frank provides for reinstatement, reasonable
fees, and double back pay.51
2. The Two Provisions
By incentivizing whistle-blowing, Dodd–Frank hoped to ferret out
wrongdoing that would otherwise go undiscovered.52  The Act encour-
ages whistle-blowers to report misconduct in two separate and distinct
ways—rewarding those who blow the whistle by granting a monetary
award when they report externally to the SEC and protecting whistle-
blowers from retaliation by their employer.
a. The Bounty Program
A claimant is eligible to receive a whistle-blower reward if he or
she voluntarily provides the SEC with “original information” about a
possible violation of the federal securities laws that has occurred, is
ongoing, or is about to occur.53  The information provided must lead to
a successful Commission action that results in an award of monetary
sanctions of at least $1 million.54  Under this program, the govern-
ment—and not an individual—brings the enforcement action.  This
procedure thus requires the information be provided directly to the
SEC.  An eligible whistle-blower may receive an award of anywhere
from 10%–30% of those monetary sanctions as well as related actions
brought by other regulatory and law enforcement authorities.55  The
award percentage may be increased or decreased depending on a num-
51. Compare id. § 1514A(c)(2) (allowing back pay), with id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (allowing
double back pay).
52. See Tammy Marzigliano & Cara E. Greene, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower
Provisions: The Act’s Best Hope for Exposing Financial Wrongdoing, 8 WORK-
PLACE L. REP. 1507 (2010).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)–(g).  The SEC’s Rule 21F-4 provides detail regarding what it
means to provide “original information.”  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b) (2015).  “The
short answer is that original information is derived from a person’s independent
knowledge (not from publicly available sources) or independent analysis (evalua-
tion of information that may be publicly available but which reveals information
not generally known) that is not already known by the Commission.”  Jennifer R.
Korb, Whistleblower Claims under the Dodd-Frank Act: Highlights from the
SEC’s Annual Report to Congress for the 2014 Fiscal Year, 28 UTAH B.J. 2d ser.
24, 25 (2015).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(1), (b).
55. Id. § 78u-6(b).  “ ‘Related actions’ include judicial or administrative actions
brought by the Attorney General of the United States, an appropriate regulatory
authority, a self-regulatory organization, or a state attorney general in a criminal
case that is based on the same original information the whistleblower voluntarily
provided to the Commission.”  Korb, supra note 53, at 25 (quoting 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.21F-3).
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ber of factors including “the extent to which the claimant participated
in the company’s internal compliance systems.”56
b. Protecting Whistle-Blowers from Retaliation
In 2013, more than one in five workers who reported misconduct,
internally or externally, said they experienced retaliation in return.57
The anti-retaliation provision allows an individual, rather than the
government, to bring a cause of action against an employer for such
reprisal.  When an employee experiences retaliation, whether a rem-
edy is available to them under Dodd–Frank depends on the approach
that worker took in reporting the misconduct.  For now, the question
of whether internal reporting is protected under Dodd–Frank is un-
clear because Congress has not explicitly spoken on the issue.  This
confusion is exacerbated by the differing court interpretations of the
whistle-blowing provision.  Thirteen federal court decisions have ad-
dressed the issue and failed to reach consistent outcomes.  Some
courts provide remedies to employees who are retaliated against for
reporting misconduct internally, and others only provide those reme-
dies to employees who report directly to the SEC.58  Two circuit courts
of appeals have faced the issue, the Second Circuit and the Fifth Cir-
cuit, and further muddied the waters by coming down on opposite
sides.59
The Dodd–Frank Anti-Retaliation Section provides:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or
indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in
the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the
whistleblower—
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with this
section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial
or administrative action of the Commission based upon or related to such
information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this chapter, includ-
ing section 78j–1(m) of this title, section 1513(e) of title 18, and any other
law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.60
Subsection (iii) provides relief for anyone who is retaliated against
for “making disclosures that are required or protected under the
56. Korb, supra note 53, at 26.  A complete list of criteria used to determine award
amounts is included in the Commission’s Rule 21F-6.  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6.
57. ETHICS RES. CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY OF THE U.S. WORKFORCE 27
(2013).  “This is nearly identical to the 22 percent retaliation rate in 2011.  It is
important to keep in mind that retaliation has not always been so widespread;
the rate was 12 percent in 2007, the first time it was measured in [the National
Business Ethics Survey].” Id.
58. See infra notes 79, 88, and accompanying text.
59. See infra subsections II.D.1–2.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012).
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Sarbanes–Oxley Act . . . , [the Securities Exchange Act], including sec-
tion 78j–1(m) of [Dodd–Frank], section 1513(e) of Title 18, and any
other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the commis-
sion.”61  Thus, while the first two subsections of the anti-retaliation
section, (i) and (ii), protect whistle-blowers who report to the SEC or
work directly with the SEC in some manner, the language of subsec-
tion (iii) appears to protect a broad range of disclosures to entities
other than the SEC.  The Sarbanes–Oxley provisions that fall within
this third subsection, for example, protect internal disclosures made to
“a person with supervisory authority over the employee.”62
The introductory paragraph expressly provides that no employer
shall take retaliatory acts against “a whistleblower in the terms and
conditions of employment because of any lawful [enumerated] act done
by the whistleblower.”63  Despite the fact that an internal disclosure
under Sarbanes–Oxley would receive protection under the
Dodd–Frank Act through its incorporation into subsection (iii),
Dodd–Frank’s definition section defines a whistle-blower as someone
who provides information to or otherwise cooperates with the Commis-
sion.64  Thus, there is a direct tension between subsection (iii), which
appears to provide protection for internal disclosures through its in-
corporation of Sarbanes–Oxley, and the statutory definition of
“whistleblower,” which requires a disclosure to the SEC.
D. The Interpretation of Dodd–Frank’s Whistle-Blower
Provisions
The courts have approached this conflict in three different ways: 1)
the Asadi approach; 2) the Chevron-deference approach; and 3) the
Bussing approach.  The Asadi and Chevron-deference approaches
have been adopted by a number of lower federal district courts, but
the Bussing court stands alone in its reasoning.  Despite its isolation,
the Bussing approach offers the most potential for consistency in the
treatment of whistle-blowers, not only at the federal level, but at the
state level as well.  This consistency in the treatment of whistle-blow-
ers, despite their method of disclosure, realizes the true purpose of the
Dodd–Frank anti-retaliation provision.
61. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
62. Caroline E. Keen, Clarifying what is “Clear”: Reconsidering Whistleblower Protec-
tions Under Dodd-Frank, 19 N.C. BANKING INST. 215, 220 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2012)).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis supplied).  Specifically, the provision forbids an
employer from discharging, demoting, suspending, threatening, harassing, di-
rectly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminating against a whistle-
blower. Id.
64. See id. § 78u-6(a)(6).
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1. The Asadi Approach
In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,65 the Fifth Circuit con-
ducted a statutory construction analysis of the language of
Dodd–Frank and “began and ended its analysis with the determina-
tion that the statutory language in Dodd–Frank was plain and unam-
biguous.”66  “The perceived conflict between [the statutory definition
of whistleblowers] and [subsection (iii)] rests on a misreading of the
operative provisions of [the Securities whistleblower incentives and
protection section of Dodd–Frank].”67  This misunderstanding, the
court continues, stems from reading the three subsections of the anti-
retaliation provision as further defining who may qualify as a whistle-
blower.  “[T]here is only one category of whistleblowers: individuals
who provide information relating to a securities law violation to the
SEC.”68  The three subsections, on the other hand, “represent the pro-
tected activity in a whistleblower-protection claim.”69  Conflict would
only exist between the definition provision and subsection (iii) “if we
read the three categories of protected activity as additional definitions
of three types of whistleblowers.”70  The Asadi court concedes that “in-
dividuals may take protected activity yet still not qualify as a
whistleblower.”71  However, the court describes this as a “practical re-
sult” rather than a sign of conflict between the provisions.72  The
question remained then, as to what activity is actually protected by
subsection (iii).
“[T]his category protects whistleblowers from retaliation, based not
on the individual’s disclosure of information to the SEC but, instead,
on that individual’s other possible required or protected disclo-
sure(s).”73  In other words, it is the internal disclosure itself rather
than the report to the SEC that protects the individual from retalia-
tion.  The court demonstrates this protection with an example:
Assume a mid-level manager discovers a securities law violation.  On the day
he makes this discovery, he immediately reports this securities law violation
(1) to his company’s chief executive officer (“CEO”) and (2) to the SEC.  Unfor-
tunately for the mid-level manager, the CEO, who is not yet aware of the dis-
closure to the SEC, immediately fires the mid-level manager.  The mid-level
manager, clearly a “whistleblower” as defined in Dodd–Frank because he pro-
vided information to the SEC relating to a securities law violation, would be
unable to prove that he was retaliated against because of the report to the
SEC.  Accordingly, the first and second category of protected activity would
65. 720 F.3d 620 (2013).
66. Keen, supra note 62, at 221.
67. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 625.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 626.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 627.
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not shield this whistleblower from retaliation.  The third category of protected
activity, however, protects the mid-level manager.  In this scenario, the inter-
nal disclosure to the CEO, a person with supervisory authority over the mid-
level manager, is protected under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, the anti-retaliation pro-
vision enacted as part of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (“the SOX anti-retal-
iation provision”).  Accordingly, even though the CEO was not aware of the
report to the SEC at the time he terminated the mid-level manager, the mid-
level manager can state a claim under the Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protec-
tion provision because he was a “whistleblower” and suffered retaliation based
on his disclosure to the CEO, which was protected under SOX.74
The court feared that any other interpretation would render the
statutory text superfluous by reading the words “ ‘to the Commission’
out of the definition of ‘whistleblower’ for purposes of the
whistleblower-protection provision,” thus violating “the surplusage ca-
non, that every word is to be given effect.”75  Finally, the court mused
that accepting another construction of the whistle-blower-protection
provision would render the Sarbanes–Oxley anti-retaliation provision
and its administrative scheme moot.76  If an internal disclosure was
covered both under Sarbanes–Oxley and under Dodd–Frank via sub-
section (iii), Asadi proposed that Sarbanes–Oxley would no longer be
useful.  Dodd–Frank protections provide for greater monetary dam-
ages, a longer statute of limitations, and the ability to file a claim in
federal court without first filing their claim with a federal agency.77
With those incentives in place, if plaintiffs seeking protection under
Dodd–Frank weren’t further required to disclose their internal com-
plaint to the SEC, the anti-retaliation provision of Sarbanes–Oxley
would be ineffective.  Thus, the court concluded, “the plain language of
the [anti-retaliation provision] limits protection under the
Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protection provision to those individuals
who provide information ‘relating to a violation of the securities laws’
to the SEC.”78
Seven federal district courts adopted this interpretation.79  How-
ever, these courts have failed to recognize a number of flaws stemming
from the Asadi analysis. Asadi completely disregards the practical as-
74. Id. at 627–628 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 628 (“[E]ven if the whistleblower-protection provision were ambiguous, we
would be reluctant to read the provision as suggested by Asadi because such a
construction would treat ‘to the Commission’ as mere surplusage.”).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 629.
78. Id. at 630 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012)).
79. See Davies v. Broadcom Corp., No. 8:15–cv–00928, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122812
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2015); Lutzeier v. Citigroup Inc., 305 F.R.D. 107 (E.D. Mo.
2015); Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640 (E.D. Wis. 2014);
Zillges v. Kenney Bank & Tr., 24 F. Supp. 3d 795 (E.D. Wis. 2014); Englehart v.
Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14–cv–444–T–33EAJ, 2014 WL 2619501 (M.D. Fla.
May 12, 2014); Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Wagner
v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12–cv–00381–RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643 (D. Colo. July 19,
2013).
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pects of whistle-blowing.  “[I]t is likely to be a very rare instance in
which a whistleblower has reported simultaneously to both his or her
supervisors and to the SEC, as an employee-whistleblower is likely to
choose one method over another.”80  Employees are often motivated to
report only internally because they feel a sense of loyalty to the com-
pany.81  They rarely understand the true implications of what they
are disclosing, and if they do, they hope to correct the misconduct
before information goes public and ruins the employer’s reputation.
On the other hand, a whistle-blower who decides to report to the SEC
or another governmental organization outside of the company is much
more likely to avoid the negative consequences stemming from report-
ing altogether.82  Those consequences include “loss of employment,
disqualification from bonuses, ostracism, and loss of workplace friend-
ships.”83  In other words, when a whistle-blower reports directly to the
SEC, the employer likely has no way of knowing who provided the
disclosure, making it less likely that that employee would face the
kinds of repercussions that render the anti-retaliation provision nec-
essary in the first place.
Further, Asadi ignores at least two advantages to bringing a claim
under Sarbanes–Oxley rather than Dodd–Frank.  For individuals who
want to avoid the burdens of pursuing the claim in court, including
potential high litigation costs that they may bear if they do not pre-
vail, actions under Sarbanes–Oxley may be attractive as the claims
are first heard in an administrative forum.84  The Department of La-
bor even assumes the responsibility for investigating the claims and
preparing evidence for the administrative review.85  Also, a claim
under Sarbanes–Oxley may afford greater recovery when, despite suf-
fering minimal pay loss, individuals have experienced emotional dis-
tress and reputational harm, but minimal pay loss as the language of
Sarbanes–Oxley, but not Dodd–Frank, has been held to authorize
such compensation.86
Ultimately, the Asadi approach fails to provide protection to an in-
ternal whistle-blower under Dodd–Frank, a result that, as explained
in Subsection III.A.2 of this Note, stands in direct contravention with
congressional intent.
80. Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program’s An-
tiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 745 (2014).
81. Id.
82. Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1151.
83. Pacella, supra note 80, at 746.
84. Brief for the SEC, supra note 42, at 25.
85. See supra subsection II.B.1.
86. Brief for the SEC, supra note 42, at 25–26.
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2. The Chevron-Deference Approach
In Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC,87 the Second Circuit used the
Chevron-deference approach.88  Under this approach, when determin-
ing whether to grant Chevron deference89 to an agency’s construction
of a statute in a question of statutory interpretation, a court asks
whether Congress has spoken directly to the issue at hand.90  If the
court determines that congressional intent is not clear with regard to
that particular issue, the court turns to the agency that has been
tasked with enforcement of the statute for guidance.91  If the agency
provides a reasonable construction of the statute, the court defers to
that administrative interpretation.92
Though the court recognized that the terms of a definitional sub-
section are usually supposed to be taken literally and applied to all
subdivisions covered by that definition, it recognized that such a
“mechanical use” of a statutory definition is not always necessary.93
“Definitions are, after all, just one indication of meaning—a very
strong indication, to be sure, but nonetheless one that can be contra-
dicted by other indications.”94  Though the definition of
“whistleblower” does not exist “in absolute conflict” with subsection
(iii), the court still found ambiguity in the statute by recognizing that
the simultaneous disclosures referred to in Asadi are not likely and
that there are categories of whistle-blowers who cannot report wrong-
doing to the SEC without first disclosing the wrongdoing to their em-
ployers.95  The court found this to be the first indication that the
statutory definition need not be mechanically applied.
A court normally searches for further indications of congressional
intent in the legislative history.  However, in finding that Congress
had not expressly addressed the question at issue, the court noted that
legislative history was of little use.  Subsection (iii) “was not in either
version of Dodd–Frank that was passed by the House and the Senate
87. 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015).
88. Five federal district court cases have adopted this interpretation. See Dressler v.
Lime Energy, No. 3:14–cv–07060, slip op. (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2015); Somers v. Digi-
tal Realty Trust, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2015); Connolly v.
Remkes, No. 5:14–CV–01344–LHK, 2014 WL 5473144 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014);
Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Mass. 2013); Khazin v. TD
Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13–4149, slip op. (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014).
89. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
90. Id. at 842.
91. Id. at 843.
92. Id. at 843–44.
93. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2015).
94. Id. (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRE-
TATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (1st ed. 2012)).
95. Id. at 150–51.
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prior to a conference.”96  The subsection was added “at the last min-
ute” without any mention of its addition in any legislative materials.97
When conferees are hastily trying to reconcile House and Senate bills, each of
which number hundreds of pages, and someone succeeds in inserting a new
provision like subdivision (iii) . . . , it is not at all surprising that no one no-
ticed that the new subdivision and the definition of “whistleblower” do not fit
together neatly.98
Ultimately, the court found it “doubtful” that the congressmen who
accepted the last-minute addition of subdivision (iii) would have ex-
pected it to have such a limited scope as it would have under the Asadi
approach and found sufficient ambiguity to give Chevron deference to
the reasonable interpretation of the SEC, the agency in charge of ad-
ministering the statute.99
The SEC’s interpretation of the statute allows for the protection of
internal whistle-blowers under SEC Rule 21F–2(b)(1) “by extending
anti-retaliation protection to individuals who first report to desig-
nated authorities other than the Commission.”100  The SEC explained
that, in adopting Rule 21F–2(b)(1), “the anti-retaliation protections
will extend to . . . employees of public companies who make certain
disclosures internally to ‘a person with supervisory authority over the
employee or such other person working for the employer who has au-
thority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct.’”101  The
reasons the SEC gives for the reasonableness of this interpretation
are four-fold: 1) it “effectuates the broad employment anti-retaliation
protections that clause (iii) contemplates;” 2) “it better supports a core
overall objective of the whistleblower rulemaking—avoiding disincen-
tivizing individuals from reporting internally first;” (3) it avoids a two-
tiered structure of protections that might discourage internal report-
ing; and (4) it stresses that “if internal compliance and reporting pro-
cedures ‘are not utilized or working, our system of securities
regulation will be less effective.’”102
Therefore, under the SEC’s view, internal whistle-blowers along
with those who report to the SEC are protected from retaliation under
Dodd–Frank.  Though this reaches the same end reached in Bussing,
the Chevron-deference approach, like the Asadi approach, misses an
important point: legislative intent was made clear with respect to the
96. Id. at 152.
97. Id. at 153, 155.
98. Id. at 154.
99. Id. at 155.
100. Brief for the SEC, supra note 42, at 29 n.20.
101. Id. at 28 (quoting Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed.
Reg. 34,300, 34,304 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249)).
102. Id. 28–29 (quoting Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provi-
sions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488,
70,500 (proposed Nov. 17, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249)).
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protection of internal whistle-blowers, thus rendering the Chevron-
deference approach unnecessary.
3. How Whistle-Blowers Have Faired
a. The Statistics of Whistle-Blowing
From 2012 to 2014, the number of whistle-blower tips received by
the Commission increased more than 20%.103  Of the 10,193 tips re-
ceived since the program began in August 2011, only fourteen have
resulted in monetary awards.104  Over 80% went to their supervisor or
compliance personnel before going to the SEC in an attempt to remedy
the problem internally.105
The National Business Ethics Survey of 2013 found that more than
nine out of ten employees reported internally when they first com-
plained about misconduct.106  Just 9% of employees first reported
problems to the government.107  Overall, only 20% of reporters ever
chose to report misconduct externally by telling someone outside their
company.108  The most common reasons for reporting externally were:
(1) the problem was ongoing and they thought someone from outside
could help stop it; (2) they did not trust anyone in their company; and
(3) they had either been retaliated against for reporting before or were
afraid of retaliation.109  Only 14% of the less than one in ten employ-
ees who reported externally were motivated to do so because of the
potential to be given a substantial money reward.110
b. Missing the Mark: Whistle-Blowers Left Without Protection
The number of retaliation cases courts see indicates that the fear of
retaliation, which motivated 40% of employees who chose not to report
internally in the above study, is not an unfounded one.  What the
Asadi approach fails to take into account, however, is the psychology
of the whistle-blower, and how, if not properly accounted for, it could
undermine the internal reporting and compliance processes main-
tained by the companies.  In fact, it is the interpretation provided by
Asadi that encourages the fears of many U.S. businesses that internal
103. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-
FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 20 (2014).
104. Korb, supra note 53, at 27.  On September 22, 2014, the SEC authorized its larg-
est award to a whistle-blower under the Dodd–Frank Act to date. U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 103, at 10.  The award was over $30 million, more than
double the amount of the previous highest award under Dodd–Frank. Id.
105. ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 57, at 29–30.
106. Id. at 29.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 30.
110. Id.
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reporting would cease after the implementation of Dodd–Frank.111
Giving individuals an opportunity to blow the whistle internally in-
creases cooperation and decreases selfishness within companies.112
[I]nternal systems of disclosure support the loyalty of employees to the insti-
tutions of which they are part and permit the expression of concerns within
those institutions.  By making such disclosures, employees may believe that
they have reduced the likelihood of retaliation by the organization’s manage-
ment. . . . . If an organization fails to consider allegations or mistreats those
employees who do speak up, others are discouraged from raising these con-
cerns internally.  The realization that whistleblowers making such disclosures
enjoy no legal protection further dissuades employees.113
Ninety-two percent of whistle-blowers report internally.114
Though the Chevron-deference approach would protect these individu-
als, such deference is not necessary.  “Recognizing the significant role
that internal company reporting can play, Congress for nearly two de-
cades has enacted a series of amendments to the securities laws to
encourage, and in some instances to require, internal reporting of po-
tential misconduct.”115  To suggest that Dodd–Frank had no intention
of protecting the majority of whistle-blowers from retaliation ignores
the events leading up the enactment of Dodd–Frank, including the
failures of Sarbanes–Oxley and the recognition of the importance of
correcting misconduct in order to prevent another Great Recession.
Further, relying on Chevron deference ignores that Congress has
given the anti-retaliation provision an express purpose.  The provision
is to provide protection to individuals who disclose misconduct in the
private sector.  Recognizing this policy paves the way for a consistent
approach to the treatment of these disclosures, not only at the federal
level, but also at the state level as well.  The Bussing approach is the
only interpretation that embraces the statute’s true purpose and
therefore renders the Chevron deference unnecessary.
E. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC
1. The Facts
In September 2011, Julie Bussing was working as an independent
contractor for COR Securities Holdings, Inc. (COR), a private invest-
ment management company.116  Bussing was a certified public ac-
111. Christopher M. Matthews, Most Whistleblowers Report Internally, Study Finds,
WALL STREET J.: CORRUPTION CURRENTS BLOG (May 30, 2012, 9:25 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/05/30/most-whistleblowers-report-inter-
nally-study-finds/.
112. See James Dungan et al., The Psychology of Whistleblowing, 6 CURRENT OPINION
IN PSYCHOL. 129 (2015).
113. VAUGHN, supra note 21, at 323.
114. ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 57, at 29.
115. Brief for the SEC, supra note 42, at 5.
116. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 723 (D. Neb. 2014).
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countant with a masters of business administration and “had obtained
a comprehensive familiarity with trading, clearing operations, fi-
nance, accounting, and compliance with the rules and regulations of
FINRA and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).”117  As part
of Bussing’s duties, she assisted with the business investigations re-
quired for COR’s acquisition of Legent Clearing, LLC (“Legent”);
Legent provides clearing services to brokerage clients and is now
COR’s wholly owned subsidiary.118  Prior to the acquisition of Legent
by COR, Legent was involved in several regulatory investigations and
examinations resulting in sanctions for violations of Financial Indus-
try Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and federal securities laws.119
“On January 1, 2012, Bussing began working for Legent as its ex-
ecutive vice president” and, pursuant to an oral agreement, reported
directly to Steven Sugarman, director and CEO of COR and the COR
Board of Directors.120  She did not report to Legent’s CEO, Christo-
pher Frankel.121  Shortly after Bussing started in this position,
FINRA began another investigation of Legent for the same types of
violations that had been found in previous years.  “On April 23, 2012,
FINRA instituted formal proceedings against Legent” for failure to
comply with the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act as well as other
financial reporting responsibilities imposed under FINRA and SEC
rules.122  FINRA, pursuant to FINRA Rule 8210, requested that Bus-
sing provide extensive documents and information to FINRA staff
when they arrived at Legent’s office on April 30.123  Bussing alleged
that “in the course of preparing responses to the request, she identi-
fied several potential or existing violations of FINRA rules and federal
securities regulations, which FINRA was likely to discover . . . .”124
Initially, Carlos Salas, a director of COR, and Sugarman expressed
their support of Bussing continuing her investigation and disclosing
what she found to FINRA.  When Bussing discovered another viola-
tion she directed Legent staff to cease processing penny stocks and to
perform several audits and account reviews.125  Salas then met with
Bussing and expressed his dissatisfaction with her response to the re-
quest and her subsequent decisions.126  According to Bussing, “Salas
advocated ignoring or responding incompletely to FINRA’s document
117. Id. at 722–23.
118. Id. at 723.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 724.
123. Id.  “FINRA Rule 8210 is a rule subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.” Id. at 734.
124. Id. at 724.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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request.”127  Bussing later discussed her findings with Legent and
COR management, including Sugarman, Salas, and Frankel, and was
told to “stall, delay, stop digging, and stop responding” to the docu-
ment request for FINRA.128  Bussing refused, and participated in
FINRA’s onsite examination of Legent in direct contravention to
orders.129
The following day, Salas notified Bussing that he, Sugarman, and
COR had decided Bussing “needed a vacation.”130  She was ordered to
take leave immediately and was told that when she returned her posi-
tion would be changed.131  Finally, around May 20th, 2012, Bussing
was notified that Legent terminated her employment.132
2. The District of Nebraska Steps In
In arguing that she was protected from retaliation under
Dodd–Frank for complying with the document process of FINRA and
making disclosures to her supervisors, Bussing pointed out, as others
before her had, that the first two subsections protect external whistle-
blowers, while the third subsection does not contain such limiting lan-
guage.  Bussing did not report to the SEC, but sought relief as an in-
ternal whistle-blower under subsection (iii)—which the District of
Nebraska granted.
The court found this to be an “unusual case” in which applying the
statutory definition of whistle-blower would defeat the purpose of sub-
section (iii), to shield a broad range of employee disclosures.133  Recog-
nizing the direct tension between the statutory definition of
“whistleblower” and subsection (iii) of the anti-retaliation provision,
the Bussing court read the ordinary meaning of whistle-blower—“a
person who tells police, reporters, etc., about something (such as a
crime) that has been kept secret,” or an “employee who reports em-
ployer wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement agency”—
into the anti-retaliation provision.134  By doing so, the Bussing court
was “faithful” to the text of the statute, gave “meaningful effect to all
of its parts,” and furthered the purposes underlying Dodd–Frank’s en-
actment following the Great Recession.135  For these reasons and
those further discussed below, Bussing presents the best interpreta-
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 724–25.
132. Id. at 725.
133. Id. at 729 (“Statutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words, of
course, in the usual case. But this is an unusual case.” (quoting Nw. Austin Mun.
Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 206–07 (2009))).
134. Id. (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 733.
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tion of the Dodd–Frank whistle-blower provisions by reading the eve-
ryday definition of “whistleblower” into the statute.  In so doing, the
court recognized Congress’s intended purpose behind the provision,
thus rendering deference to the SEC regulations unnecessary.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The District of Nebraska Correctly Interpreted the
Dodd–Frank Whistle-Blower Protections
1. Separating the Anti-Retaliation Provision From the Bounty
Program
The court in Bussing begins its analysis by making one subtle, but
very important, distinction regarding the whistle-blower provisions of
Dodd–Frank: the Dodd–Frank Act amended the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 to “provide incentives for whistleblowers to report
to the SEC in the form of a ‘bounty’ program,” as well as “created a
private cause of action for certain individuals whose employers retali-
ate against them for taking certain protected actions.”136  Where other
courts have treated the anti-retaliation provision and the bounty pro-
gram of Dodd–Frank whistle-blower protections as one, serving a com-
mon purpose, incentivizing the same kind of actions, and providing
the same form of protection, Bussing is quick to point out that this is
not the case.  This distinction is critical.  Whistle-blowers who are re-
porting internally to their direct supervisors or upper-management
are not motivated to disclose by the monetary gain provided by the
bounty program but instead are motivated to disclose out of loyalty to
the company and respect for their job.137  Further, internal whistle-
blowers likely report without knowing the seriousness of the violation
and are merely hoping to get the situation fixed as soon as possible.
Recognizing this distinction made it possible to read the ordinary
meaning of the word whistle-blower into the anti-retaliation provision
alone.
If . . . the anti-retaliation provision is read using the word “whistleblower” in
its everyday sense, there is no such tension.  In that sense, a whistleblower is
“a person who tells police, reporters, etc., about something (such as a crime)
that has been kept secret,” or an “employee who reports employer wrongdoing
to a governmental or law-enforcement agency.”  If this reading of the term
“whistleblower is applied to the anti-retaliation provision—while maintaining
the statutory definition for the other subsections, which deal solely with the
bounty program—all parts of the statute fit together into a harmonious and
coherent whole.  This interpretation gives effect to the full range of disclosures
protected by the anti-retaliation provision, while reserving rewards under the
bounty program for whistleblowers who report to the SEC.138
136. Id. at 728.
137. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
138. Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 729 (citations omitted).
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Ultimately, the court found it apparent that Congress intended the
word whistle-blower to be given its ordinary meaning, despite the
presence of a statutory definition to the contrary, and applied the ordi-
nary meaning to the anti-retaliation provision only.  In so finding, the
court believed it pertinent to explain the full scope of subsection (iii)’s
reach.
Subsection (iii) operates by incorporation; it protects disclosures required or
protected by other laws.  Unlike the preceding subsections, it applies to disclo-
sures that are completely unrelated to any tip to the SEC.  And, most impor-
tantly, subsection (iii) applies to a vast array of situations where the
applicable laws or regulations call for disclosure to entities other than the
SEC—disclosures that would not qualify for protection if the statutory defini-
tion of “whistleblower” is applied. . . .
[For example,] subsection (iii) protects disclosures required or protected by the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002.  This statute, in turn, protects a broad range of
employee disclosures to persons or entities other than the SEC, including in-
ternal reports to company officials.139
The court further references the distinction between the anti-retal-
iation provision and the bounty program when comparing the three
subsections.  “[S]ubsection (i) only applies to information provided ‘in
accordance with this section,’ that is, tips under the bounty pro-
gram.”140  Subsection (ii) encompasses a slightly broader scope of dis-
closures in that it aims at covering testimony or assistance based upon
or related to the tip.141  By contrast, subsection (iii) protects an even
broader category of disclosures that don’t require any connection to
the SEC.  To the court, this lack of connection makes sense, because
the “anti-retaliation provision was drafted to have effect independent
of the bounty program.”142  Without congressional intent to grant the
bounty and anti-retaliation provisions independent effect, “it simply
doesn’t make sense” that subsection (iii) would explicitly apply to a
range of disclosures, not just those made to the SEC, because disclo-
sures not made to the SEC “would never fall under the bounty
program.”143
2. Doing Away with Chevron Deference
Bussing points out that a lack of legislative history directly on
point does not mean that Congress did not have a specific intent with
regard to the purpose of Dodd–Frank.  Dodd–Frank put into place “the
toughest consumer financial protections in our history” with the ulti-
139. Id. (citation omitted).
140. Id. at 730 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i) (2012)).
141. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A)(ii) (2012)).
142. Id.
143. Id.  The court draws further support from the fact that subsections (i) and (ii) do
not require that a tip meet the qualifications for an award, nor that the informa-
tion or other assistance result in a successful enforcement action. Id. at 730 n.11.
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mate goal of making the financial system more transparent.144  Whis-
tle-blowers are the “single most effective source of information” in
detecting and correcting corporate misconduct.145  The anti-retalia-
tion provision of Dodd–Frank was intended to protect those individual
employees who would provide this vital information.
The court noted that nothing in the legislative history suggested
Congress anticipated a potential conflict between the statutory defini-
tion of “whistleblower” and subsection (iii).  There were scant refer-
ences to what would become the Securities Whistleblower Incentives
and Protection Section,146 and even fewer regarding the late addition
of subsection (iii).147  Further, the term “whistleblower” was not pre-
sent in the anti-retaliation provision until the bill passed the Senate,
where the phrase “employee, contractor, or agent” in the anti-retalia-
tion provision was replaced with “whistleblower.”148  Without gui-
dance from legislative history, the court conceded that it could
embrace one of two interpretations of the language: the one described
above “which harmonizes all parts of the statute and gives subsection
(iii) a meaningful purpose” or the interpretation suggested in
Asadi.149
The court found that Asadi not only fails to protect the majority of
whistle-blowers but also fails to protect those who are most vulnerable
to retaliation—internal reporters.150  The Bussing court feared that
adopting the Asadi interpretation would disincentivize internal re-
porting, something Congress would not have intended for a number of
reasons, but mostly because internal reporting: (1) “allows companies
to remedy improper conduct at an early stage”; (2) prevents simple
misunderstandings from becoming larger problems; and (3) keeps re-
ports out of the SEC that could be more efficiently handled internally,
which would otherwise waste government resources.151  Additionally,
144. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Wall Street Reform (June
25, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-wall-
street-reform-1 [https://perma.unl.edu/EMS8-Z5QJ]; see also S. REP. NO. 111-176,
at 2 (2010) (stating Dodd–Frank was “designed to improve accountability, resili-
ency, and transparency in the financial system.”).
145. KOHN, supra note 27, at xii.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
147. Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 731.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 731–732.
150. Id. at 733.
151. Id.
Encouraging external reporting over internal reporting is problematic
for several reasons.  First, the bounty provisions require whistleblowers
to report original information to the SEC.  Therefore, employees are
more likely to rush to report information about securities violations to
the SEC—without verifying the information’s accuracy—in order to be
the first party to report the violation.  This rush to report violations
without verification leads, in turn, to the second problem with external
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the court noted that it is counterintuitive to call upon employees to
report to the SEC should they want any protection for making an in-
ternal report.152
In recognizing that Congress clearly would not intend to disincen-
tive internal reporting, Bussing demonstrates why Chevron deference
is not necessary.  When congressional intent is clear, it is unnecessary
to turn to the SEC’s interpretation of the statute.153  Subsection (iii)
was enacted to protect a wide range of disclosures, and reading the
ordinary definition of whistle-blower into the anti-retaliation provi-
sion best gives effect to the statute’s true purpose.
3. Going Even Further: Recognizing the History of Whistle-
Blower Protection
Though Bussing persuasively describes why, due to the very na-
ture of the whistle-blower, Congress would not have intended to dis-
incentivize internal whistle-blowing, the court in Bussing could have
made its argument even more persuasive by analyzing the history of
internal whistle-blower protection.  Congress has spent nearly two de-
cades amending past securities laws to encourage, or even require, in-
ternal reporting of potential misconduct.154  In addition to the
implementation of Sarbanes–Oxley in 2002, Congress amended the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.155  In 1995, Congress added a sec-
tion to the Securities Exchange Act that imposes a series of internal
company disclosure obligations on an accountant who discovers a pub-
reporting: flooding the SEC with frivolous tips.  The SEC, burdened with
a flood of frivolous tips, may have trouble distinguishing legitimate tips
of securities violations from meritless ones, and it will have to spend
time and effort weeding out the frivolous tips rather than focusing on
correcting legitimate violations of securities laws.  Finally, encouraging
employees to race to report violations to the SEC undermines the culture
of corporate compliance that companies set up in the wake of Sarbanes-
Oxley.  The bounty program will “promote the very culture of opportu-
nism that these [internal] compliance systems are intended to combat.”
Jeff Vogt, Note, Don’t Tell Your Boss? Blowing the Whistle on the Fifth Circuit’s
Elimination of Anti-Retaliation Protection for Internal Whistleblowers Under
Dodd-Frank, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 353, 377 (2015) (alteration in original) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistle-
blowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting”, 45 CONN. L.
REV. 483, 520 (2012)).
152. Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 732–733 (“And there are no doubt others who are
simply not savvy enough to know that they should take the counterintuitive step
of first reporting to the SEC if they want any protection for internal reporting.”).
153. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”).
154. Brief for the SEC, supra note 42, at 5.
155. Id.
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lic company has taken part in an illegal act.156  This process of disclo-
sure only allows the auditing accountant to make a disclosure to the
SEC after internal disclosures and other conditions are met, including
a failure of the company to take an appropriate response to the
disclosure.157
Subsection 7245(1) of Sarbanes–Oxley requires attorneys to report
material violations of securities laws to the chief legal counsel or chief
executive officer (CEO) of a public company.158  If the CEO does not
appropriately respond, the attorney is then required to report the vio-
lations to the audit or other committee of the board of directors.159
The SEC’s Standards of Professional Conduct recognize that by re-
porting internally first an attorney “does not reveal client confidences
or secrets or privileged or otherwise protected information related to
the attorney’s representation of an issuer.”160
Finally, though the bounty program requires a whistle-blower to
provide information directly to the SEC, the monetary reward a re-
porter receives can increase depending on the extent to which the
claimant participated in the company’s internal compliance systems
already in place.161  Incentivizing internal reporting in the bounty
program while disincentivizing it in the area of protection from retali-
ation is counterintuitive.  This kind of disconnect would only serve to
confuse an employee who is determining the best way to move forward
after observing misconduct.
Though Bussing recognizes that encouraging internal whistle-
blowing is important because whistle-blowers are much more likely to
disclose information internally, the court fails to recognize that fed-
eral law also requires certain individuals to report internally.  Audi-
tors and attorneys “would gain little, if any, Dodd–Frank protection if
subdivision (iii), despite cross-referencing Sarbanes–Oxley provisions
protecting lawyers, protected only against retaliation for reporting to
the Commission.”162  With these issues in mind, it is clear that Con-
gress fully intended to protect internal whistle-blowers.  To conclude
156. Id. at 5–6.
157. Id. at 6.
158. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012).
159. Id.
160. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2015).  Only where an attorney “reasonably believes it is
‘necessary’ to report to the Commission to prevent a securities law violation that
will cause substantial financial injury, or to correct past violations of similar se-
verity where the attorney’s services were used—may attorneys report evidence of
a material violation to the Commission.”  Brief for the SEC, supra note 42, at 7
n.8 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)).  Even then, “an attorney will typically need to
report internally first in order to satisfy the requirement that disclosure to the
Commission may be necessary.” Id.
161. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
162. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2015).
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otherwise would suggest that Congress was undoing nearly two de-
cades of amendments encouraging internal reports.
Bussing didn’t delve as deep into congressional history as it could
have, but the court takes a powerful stance in recognizing the intent
Congress clearly had in enacting the anti-retaliation provision of
Dodd–Frank.  Recognizing this policy provides for consistent treat-
ment of employees who recognize misconduct and hope to correct it,
even if they take their concerns to their employer rather than the
SEC. Bussing not only promotes this consistent treatment of whistle-
blowers under federal law, but also under state law through the public
policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.  Thus, Bussing is
an important vehicle through which Congress’s acknowledgment of
the fundamental importance of whistle-blowers in ferreting out
wrongdoing can be actualized throughout the United States.
B. State Whistle-Blower Law Implications
In addition to her claim under Dodd–Frank, Julie Bussing also as-
serted a Nebraska tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy.163  In Nebraska, “[u]nless constitutionally, statutorily,
or contractually prohibited, an employer, without incurring liability,
may terminate an at-will employee at any time with or without rea-
son.”164  There is, however, a public policy exception to the at-will em-
ployment doctrine.165  Under this exception, an employee can bring a
common law tort claim for wrongful discharge when the reason for the
firing violates public policy.166  However, the public policy exception is
restricted to cases where a “clear mandate of public policy has been
violated, and it should be limited to manageable and clear stan-
dards.”167  “In determining whether a clear mandate of public policy is
violated, courts should inquire whether the employer’s conduct contra-
venes the letter or purpose of a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory
provision or scheme.”168
Because the court found the parties’ dispute to be “purely theoreti-
cal” at that point in the case, the court assumed that “a federal law
can provide the source of public policy for a state tort claim.”169  “Con-
gress has declared that it violates public policy when whistleblowers
are fired in retaliation for conduct covered in [the anti-retaliation pro-
163. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 736 (D. Neb. 2014).
164. Coffey v. Planet Group, Inc., 287 Neb. 834, 844, 845 N.W.2d 255, 263–264 (2014);
Trosper v. Bag ‘N Save, 273 Neb. 855, 857, 734 N.W.2d 704, 706–707 (2007).
165. Coffey, 287 Neb. at 844, 845 N.W.2d at 264.
166. Id. at 844, 845 N.W.2d at 264.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 736 (D. Neb. 2014).
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vision of Dodd–Frank].  The Court cannot alter Congress’s expression
of public policy. . . .”170
Nebraska is not alone in recognizing a public policy exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine.  In fact, the judiciaries of at least
forty-five states have recognized such claims.171  These states place
their own particular limits on what constitutes “public policy” recog-
nizable by the court, for example, Nebraska requires a “clear man-
date” of public policy, while others require that the public policy be
“clear and compelling,” “important and clearly articulated,” or “involve
a matter of public concern.”172  When these limitations are met, how-
ever, the question remains in many states whether those judiciaries
accept federal law as the public policy of a state.
There are three main approaches that courts have taken in determining to
what extent federal law can be the basis of a claim for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy: (1) treating federal law the same as state law in
evaluating whether it can serve as the state’s public policy; (2) requiring the
plaintiff to establish some link between federal law and the state’s public pol-
icy in order to base the claim on federal law; and (3) refusing to allow federal
law to be the source of public policy.173
While the majority of wrongful discharge claims in violation of public
policy have relied on state—not federal—law, Bussing shows that
Dodd–Frank certainly presents a clear mandate of public policy that
can be used consistently in state courts accepting public policy based
on federal law.174
By doing away with the Chevron deference, Bussing recognized the
public policy and purpose behind Dodd–Frank.  In acknowledging that
public policy explicitly, the Bussing court opens the door to a more
consistent protection of whistle-blowers at the state level under the
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.  This
would result in internal whistle-blowers not only being protected at
the federal level, but at the state level as well.  Though this result is
certainly not possible under the Asadi approach, not even the Chev-
ron-deference approach is able to provide such consistent relief to in-
ternal whistle-blowers at all levels.  The Chevron-deference approach
accepts the premise that the purpose behind the statute is unclear and
that protecting internal whistle-blowers is merely a reasonable inter-
pretation of the law.  This precedent would not meet the burden in
many states that retaliation against a whistle-blower clearly violates
public policy.  Therefore, not only did Bussing correctly address the
170. Id. (citing Amen v. Astrue, 284 Neb. 691, 696, 822 N.W.2d 419, 423 (2012)).
171. Nancy Modesitt, Wrongful Discharge: The Use of Federal Law as a Source of Pub-
lic Policy, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 623, 623 (2006).
172. See id. at 625–626; Coffey, 287 Neb. at 844, 845 N.W.2d at 264.
173. Modesitt, supra note 171, at 636.
174. For further discussion regarding whistle-blower protection under state laws, see
Richard Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 975
(2008).
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issue, but it opened the door for the most consistent application of
Dodd–Frank to not only internal and external whistle-blowers but
also to state and federal whistle-blowers as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Federal District Court of Nebraska sets an important prece-
dent in recognizing that Congress intended to implement a public pol-
icy of protecting whistle-blowers because they have not been
adequately protected in the past.  The majority of whistle-blowers re-
port internally, either by natural inclination or by statutory require-
ment.  Therefore, in order to adequately incentivize the disclosure of
misconduct by private-sector employees, internal whistle-blowers
must have a cause of action to seek redress when they are subse-
quently retaliated against by an employer for making a disclosure.
Not only is it counterintuitive to require a double disclosure to both a
supervisor as well as the government, the very nature of external re-
porting does not elicit the retaliatory responses that Dodd–Frank
seeks to redress.  External whistle-blowers remain anonymous
throughout the Dodd–Frank process and are unlikely to be discovered,
as they did not speak directly to a supervisor about their concerns.
When courts fail to recognize that it is in line with public policy to
protect internal whistle-blowers from retaliation, Dodd–Frank not
only ignores these individuals at the federal level, but they are also
deprived of protection at the state level.  By recognizing this public
policy of Dodd–Frank, Bussing paves the way for this public policy to
be extended into the realm of the states through the public policy ex-
ception to the employment-at-will doctrine.  This consistent applica-
tion of the law at all levels further serves Congress’s intent to provide
protection for whistle-blowers in the private sector.  To rule otherwise
and disincentivize internal reporting would mean disaster for compa-
nies’ current internal compliance mechanisms and the ability to cor-
rect misconduct before reaching the disastrous level prior to the Great
Recession of 2008.
